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I Articles I
Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by
the Sword?
Charles Chernor Jalloh*
Abstract
This article examines the right to self-representation in international
criminal law, and the common challenges posed for judges effectuating
that right in international criminal courts. Using a comparative law
approach, the paper demonstrates how the interpretation of that right
initially borrowed heavily from U.S. common law and later European
civil law to address the problems caused by self-representing, disruptive,
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and uncooperative defendants. Although the right to self-representation
is a Sixth Amendment right in U.S. law, and an equally fundamental one
in international law, the author contends that this right seems better in
theory than in practice. Indeed, since no self-representing defendant in
an international penal court has ever succeeded in securing an acquittal,
by choosing to represent themselves, defendants who lack the ability,
objectivity, and experience needed to raise reasonable doubt in complex
criminal trials may unwittingly help pave the prosecution's way to their
own convictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 2001, former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milogevi6,
who was on trial for his alleged role in perpetrating international crimes
in the Balkans, informed the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) that he did not want a lawyer
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to represent him during future proceedings.' The judges allowed
Milogevi6 to continue in this manner, but also appointed amicus curiae to
assist the Court.2 As Milogevi's health began to diminish, the ICTY
faced difficult questions regarding if and when to assign counsel to
represent the accused and, in so doing, restrict Milogevi6's right to
defend himself. The ICTY's handling of these problems, as well as
Milogevi's subsequent death before the completion of his trial, thrust
unresolved questions of international criminal procedure into the
spotlight.3
Since then, many defendants before the ICTY and other
international criminal courts have tried to follow Milogevi6's lead and
represent themselves. Others, failing to gain permission to continue
without legal counsel, have instead attempted to emulate Milogevi's
other lead to disrupt the trial proceedings as much as possible. The
evolving body of international criminal law has responded to these
challenges by developing procedures to deal with defendants who want
to represent themselves or who create large and continuous disruptions of
court proceedings.
This article discusses the various roles played by counsel in
international criminal trials in the limited circumstances where
defendants choose to represent themselves, be disruptive, or engage in
obstructionist behavior. I demonstrate that, much like U.S. criminal law,
in international criminal law, accused persons have the fundamental right
to represent themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own
choosing. That said, while the right to self-representation sounds good in
theory, in practice, it is fraught with difficulties. It is a right that
defendants before international tribunals should invoke sparingly, if at
all, especially considering that these defendants usually stand accused of
some of the worst crimes in the legal lexicon.
A review of leading cases shows that, by conveniently borrowing
from Anglo-American common law in some cases, and continental
European civil law in others, international criminal courts have failed to
develop a single or unified approach to defendants' right to self-
representation. This lack of uniformity has hindered the accused persons
1. Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Written Note by the Accused,
Registry, 3371-72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2001); Prosecutor
v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-99-37-I, Initial Appearance, Transcript, 1-2 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2001).
2. See generally Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54, Order Inviting
Designation of Amicus Curiae (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 30,
2001) [hereinafter Milogevi6, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae].
3. See Joanne Williams, Slobodan Miloevie and the Guarantee of Self-
Representation, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 553, 554-55 (2007).
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who have sought to use, and sometimes abuse, the right for political
purposes. I submit that, since no self-representing defendant in an
international trial has yet succeeded in securing an acquittal, by choosing
to exercise the right to self-representation, even legally trained
defendants who lack the objectivity, ability, and experience in
challenging prosecution evidence in complex criminal trials may risk
helping prosecutors pave the way to their own convictions.
The article proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on the
right to self-representation and the role of assigned, standby, and amicus
counsel in international criminal proceedings. Part III examines common
law and civil law approaches to the right of self-representation. The
focus, although not exclusively, is on the U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence that supplied helpful precedent on how to interpret the
right of self-representation in the early international criminal tribunal
cases.
Part IV discusses the main circumstances under which national
courts using these principles appoint counsel to represent the accused,
even against his objections, so long as his conduct threatens to derail the
integrity of the trial process. Part IV then assesses how well these
principles have been transposed to and applied in international criminal
courts. I show that, in national jurisdictions, limited wiggle room is
typically afforded to obstructionist defendants bent on undermining their
own trials. On the other hand, in some international courts, especially in
their early cases, disruptive defendants seem to engage in contumacious
conduct without immediately receiving meaningful sanction, such as the
logical forfeiture of the right to represent themselves in court. This
disruptive behavior has caused unacceptable delays in many important
cases and has impelled a shift away from the common law's deference
towards an accused person's right to defend himself in person in favor of
the civil law approach, which seems less hesitant to curtail the
defendant's rights in order to maintain the overall continuity and
integrity of the proceedings.
Finally, in Part V, I conclude with key findings and some final
observations. I note the general improvement in international criminal
tribunals' ability to smoothly handle self-representing, disruptive, or
uncooperative defendants. It seems settled that the right to choose
whether to be represented by counsel or to appear pro se is an inherent
right of the defendant that should never be abrogated. However, the
attempts by some high profile accused persons to turn the courtroom into
a platform to advance divisive ethnic political agendas, to badger
witnesses and victims, and to transform the dignified search for justice
into political theater undermines both the legal and moral justifications
for the right. If this trend continues, as international criminal law
[Vol. 117:3
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matures, the tendency will likely be for the right to be increasingly
curtailed over time.
II. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AND THE ROLE OF COUNSEL
IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
A. The Types of Counsel Used by International Courts
International courts employ three main types of legal counsel as
tools to maintain control over proceedings in cases involving
uncooperative or disruptive defendants: (1) standby or duty counsel,
(2) court-assigned counsel, and (3) amicus curiae. Standby counsel is a
lawyer appointed by the court to assist an accused who is asserting the
right of self-representation.4 This attorney, who may be designated at the
court's own initiative, generally assists the defendant in properly
preparing and presenting his case by, for example, helping him
understand and navigate basic courtroom procedures.5 The lawyer is
literally on "standby" ready to step in at short notice should the court
order him to take over the defense case in exceptional circumstances.
For instance, standby counsel may be ordered to step in where the
defendant engages in disruptive behavior or other conduct requiring his
removal from the courtroom, falls ill for an extended period, or is
otherwise unable to continue participating in the proceedings.
The key is that, once appointed, a standby lawyer can only provide
assistance if and to the extent requested by the self-representing
defendant, who still enjoys the core right and bears primary
responsibility to lead and present his own defense. A self-representing
accused, including one taking advantage of the assistance offered by
standby counsel, may still seek legal advice from a lawyer of his own
choosing at his own expense. It seems common in some of the tribunals,
where the defendant is indigent, for publicly funded counsel to also be
made available to assist the accused acting pro se for interest of justice
reasons. This feature is found in various jurisdictions such as the United
4. Although the idea of standby counsel was first discussed in the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-T,
Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw, 18-22 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter
Barayagwiza, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw], a detailed discussion
of the concept was later given in the ICTY case of Prosecutor v. ,eel', Case No. IT-03-
67-PT, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist
Vojislav egelj with His Defence, 12-30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
May 9, 2003) [hereinafter egelj, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing
Counsel to Assist Vojislav egelj with His Defence].
5. See egelj, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav egelj with His Defence, supra note 4, 30.
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States, giving rise to a hybrid type of self-representation with the
background assistance and advice of qualified defense counsel or legal
researchers.
Another term often used for a specific type of "standby counsel" is
"duty counsel." Sometimes, the phrase "duty counsel" is used as short
hand reference to a lawyer who may be ordered to provide initial legal
advice and assistance to an accused pending the appointment of counsel
say following arrest or if the defendant suddenly elects to represent
himself. This "duty" includes assisting the suspect with summary
procedures, such as during his arraignment, or stepping in to represent
the defendant's interest when he is not present in court on his own
volition or when the court has ordered his removal.
The duty counsel is typically but not necessarily always a tribunal
employee. Where duty counsel is an employed attorney, in a registry
defense office or other similar unit, a common challenge that has arisen
for international criminal courts is how to separate the double functions
of the lawyer in his capacity as an employee administratively reporting to
court seniors in the Registry and that of his role as attorney with
responsibility only to act in the best interests of his client. Although as a
matter of principle, it is obvious that the duty counsel in such cases
should only take instructions from his client-whose interests he is
sworn to protect to the best of his ability-it is not uncommon that some
senior tribunal officials fail to appreciate the need to separate the
lawyer's dual functions. That is, it would be generally permissible to
address the duty counsel as a subordinate on purely administrative and
non-client matters, whereas it is completely unethical to encroach on his
role as a legal counselor to the defendant.
In some cases, court officials at the highest levels have attempted to
instruct duty counsel on issues touching on the lawyer's privileged
relationship with his client. In other cases, the repeated insinuations of
guilt, in violation of the defendant's presumption of innocence, were
rather obvious. This was certainly my experience when I briefly served
as court-appointed duty counsel in the Charles Taylor case at the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in June 2007. That occurrence led to my
resignation from that tribunal a few months later, after efforts to
communicate the distinction between the two roles to the powers that be
was ignored. Of course, by the time of my resignation, private defense
counsel had been found for the defendant, and the case file had been
properly transferred.
Yet, anecdotal evidence suggests that my experience in the Taylor
case was not unique. Other defense lawyers have faced the same or
similar type of dilemma in other international criminal courts. This
experience indicates that, all things being equal, appointing a lawyer who
[Vol. 117:3
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is not staff as duty counsel may be relatively more expensive from a
tribunal perspective but should be preferred in principle since, in contrast
to private defense counsel, court staff attorneys are not typically as
independent as are contracted private defense counsel. This is not to
suggest that tribunal lawyers would compromise their clients' interests.
Rather, it is to observe that despite the best possible advocacy and hard
work of some of the best and most committed lawyers, they sometimes
get trapped in a spiral that is not of their own making, reflecting a
fundamental structural flaw in the institutional apparatus of international
criminal justice. On the other hand, the benefits that will accrue from
hiring private defense counsel to be duty counsel in any given case will
depend on the tribunal and case under consideration, so assessments as to
the right decision must be made on a situation-specific basis.
Court assigned counsel is imposed by order of the court, usually
over the defendant's objections, and is given the responsibility to ensure
the defense of the accused person. International tribunals usually assign
attorneys to represent accused persons in circumstances where the
chamber considers such assignment in the best interests of justice.
Tribunals often make such a finding due to the defendant's substantial
and persistent obstruction of the proceedings, which threatens the fair
and proper administration of justice.
The role of a court-assigned lawyer must be distinguished from that
of what we might for convenience call administratively appointed
counsel. Administratively appointed counsel is normally selected and
appointed to represent an indigent or partially indigent person by a
tribunal administrator (usually the registrar or his delegate, the principal
defender or equivalent), after full consultations with the defendant.
Although the case law is often inconsistent in the terminology used, the
distinction between court-assigned counsel and administratively
appointed counsel is not only semantic, it is critical both for reasons of
principle and practice. In principle, except perhaps when the defendant's
previously chosen counsel is appointed by the court as standby counsel
to continue to represent the accused, court-assigned counsel is the court's
chosen lawyer representing the defendant in the proceedings rather than
the defendant's choice legal representative.
In practice, depending on the reasons why counsel is being
imposed, the lawyer forced upon an accused may not necessarily receive
any instructions from the "client" or gain his cooperation on the
presentation of the defense case. Whether the defendant instructs or
refuses to instruct counsel obviously has serious implications for the type
and effectiveness of the defense that the lawyer can mount to counter the
prosecution's case. The appointment, therefore, usually raises ethical
concerns for the attorney regarding the propriety of representing a
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defendant who might be unhappy or even prove to be uncooperative in
respect of the defense.
Conversely, in the case of counsel administratively assigned by the
registrar or the principal defender, the lawyer typically enjoys the
cooperation of his client. An administratively assigned lawyer is usually
selected from the list of counsel, taking into account the wishes of the
accused. The attorney can therefore seek, receive, and act on instructions
from the defendant on how best to challenge the prosecution's
allegations. Consequently, because the accused participates in the
selection of counsel, the accused is more likely to engage with the
counsel to put forth a proper defense, including directing counsel to
prospective witnesses.
The consequence of a lawyer's appointment to represent an accused
by the court, instead of by administrative decision of the registrar, also
affects who can terminate counsel. While usually permitted only during
the pre-trial phase, lawyers administratively appointed to represent the
accused can be replaced, for example, at the defendant's request simply
by withdrawing counsel and replacing him with another. For practical
reasons, the chances that counsel will be replaced at the accused's
request decreases dramatically as the case progresses towards trial and
becomes extremely difficult once trial has begun. The reason is that
lawyers are generally expected to represent the defendants to the finality
of the case, although this presumes that no total breakdown in the
counsel-client relationship occurs along the way.
On the other hand, attorneys appointed to represent a defendant by
order of the court can only be replaced by fiat of judicial decision.
Furthermore, assuming that there is no serious breakdown in the lawyer-
client relationship, the likelihood that a court will countenance an
administrative change of appointed counsel diminishes dramatically once
the trial has begun. A change in counsel is usually only allowed in the
most exceptional circumstances when there is no serious threat of a delay
to the case or disruption to the smooth continuation of the proceedings.
It follows that there is a type of interplay between the stage of the
trial and the ability of administrators to fulfill the defendant's wish to
replace his counsel. The closer to the hearing of evidence it is, the more
likely that the chamber will have strong views as to whether it is truly
necessary to replace counsel. In some courts, administrators therefore
end up seeking informal approval from the judges before the power to
administratively remove the lawyer is exercised. This type of informal
check makes sense given the court's primary responsibility to adjudicate
the case within a reasonable time and to provide the defendant with a fair
trial, which includes, if the accused so wishes, the right to be represented
by competent counsel.
(Vol. 117:3
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The third procedural device used by international criminal courts is
amicus curiae, or "friend of the court.",6 As specifically employed in
international criminal trials, amicus curiae is a creative option that the
tribunals have developed to ensure a particular (defense) perspective is
presented during the trial or appeal phase of a case. The amicus
counsel's duty is to assist the court in any manner counsel deems
appropriate to ensure a fair trial and proper determination of the case
before the court. For example, amicus counsel may make oral or written
submissions on any procedural, evidentiary, or substantive issue that
could have been properly raised in response to the prosecution case or
bring to the chamber's attention any exculpatory or mitigating evidence
in favor of the accused.7 The appointment of an amicus attorney usually
takes place in situations where the defendant has resisted, or indicated
that he will resist, the assignment or appointment of counsel to represent
him because he prefers to represent himself personally.
Crucially, the amicus, whose main function is to assist the court in
its task of rendering credible justice rather than to represent the
defendant8 as such, may or may not receive any cooperation from the
accused. The amicus operates independently of the accused, although he
presents arguments intended to advance the accused person's position in
the case. The chamber, having appointed counsel, also retains discretion
to terminate the amicus curiae appointment. 9 Termination can also occur
where, for example, the accused complains that the conduct of such
counsel shows that he is biased against the defendant or had already
formulated conclusions as to guilt.
B. Use of Counsel by the International Tribunals
These three procedural devices involving various shades of counsel
appointments have been used by the ICTY and other ad hoc tribunals
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL), and even in the nascent practice of the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC). They have been used in these tribunals both
6. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 69 (3d ed. 1969).
7. See Milogevi6, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae, supra note 2, 1.
8. See Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel, 3 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 4, 2003) [hereinafter Milofevie, Reasons for Decision on the
Prosecution Motion Concerning Assignment of Counsel].
9. See Prosecutor v. Milogevik, Case No. IT-02-54, Transcript of Record, at 11441,
11. 10-14 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 10, 2002).
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individually, and in combination, with varying degrees of success.10 In
making decisions regarding use of standby, amicus, or court appointed
counsel to self-representing or disruptive defendants, international
criminal courts are not simply flying blind. Statutory language that is
drawn from universal and regional human rights instruments is
commonly shared by nearly all of these tribunals, and helps to guide and
shape or limit their rulings and approaches.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
states in Article 14(3)(d) that everyone shall be guaranteed, at a
minimum, the right
[t]o be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or
through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he
does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal
assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice
so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does
not have sufficient means to pay for it. 
11
The ICTY in Article 21(4)(d) and the ICTR in Article 20(4)(d) adopt
nearly the same language in their respective statutes, 12 as does the SCSL
in Article 17(4)(d). The European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) similarly grants a criminal defendant the right "to defend
himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing."' 3
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) guarantees "the
right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by
legal counsel of his own choosing.
1 4
Interestingly, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
(ACHPR) diverges from the European and American conventions by
granting a relatively broader right to a defense of which the role of
counsel is only one component. Article 7(c) of the ACHPR provides
each individual "the right to defense, including the right to be defended
10. The STL has not actually held a trial yet, but provisions of the rules of the Court
reflect awareness of this issue. This observation is mentioned further below.
11. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1996, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
12. The ICTR statute reads "himself or herself' rather than only "himself." Statute
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other
Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States, between 1 January
1994 and 31 December 1994, art. 20(4)(d), Nov. 8, 1994, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/itr.htm.
13. The European Convention on Human Rights and Human Freedoms art. 6,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
14. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 8,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR].
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by counsel of his choice." 15 Article 7(c) implies that the defendant, at
least in principle, is also guaranteed the lawyer of his choice. That
interpretation is obviously correct if the defendant pays for his lawyer.
But this reading appears to be a much more expansive understanding of
the scope of the right to counsel when public funds are being used if
compared to the emerging jurisprudence of the international criminal
tribunals that qualifies the right. Perhaps the African position is a
welcome nuance to that jurisprudence in favor of the defendant, if indeed
the right is actually given effect in practice.
Beyond the ACHPR, only two other ad hoc courts diverge from the
nearly identical statutory provisions of the other tribunals. Although
Article 67(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
similarly enshrines the accused person's right "to conduct his defense in
person or through legal assistance of the accused's choosing," it
explicitly qualifies the enjoyment of that right.16 If the accused is present
in court but "continues to disrupt the trial," the chamber "may remove
the accused" after "other reasonable alternatives" have been exhausted.
1 7
However, in such instances, the judges are obliged to provide alternate
means for the accused "to observe the trial and instruct counsel from
outside the courtroom.' 8 That said, recognizing the exceptional nature
and potential negative impact of such a measure on the fairness and
ultimate outcome of the proceedings, Article 63(2) provides that barring
defendants from court and ordering alternative forms of participation is
strictly limited to the duration necessary for the trial's return to
normalcy.19
Similarly, while Article 16(4)(d) of the Statute of the STL grants
defendants the right to "be tried in his or her presence, and to defend
himself or herself in person or through legal assistance of his or her own
choosing," the STL's Rules of Evidence and Procedure state that "[t]he
Pre-Trial Judge or a Chamber may impose counsel present or otherwise
assist the accused in accordance with international criminal law and
international human rights where this is deemed necessary in the interests
of justice and to ensure a fair and expeditious trial.,20  This final
15. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
16. The fair trial rights of the accused are set forth in Article 67, whereas Article 63
discusses trial presence. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 63,
67, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force on July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
17. Id. art. 63.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See STL R. P. & EvID. 59F, STL/BD/2009/01/Rev. 3 (Mar. 20, 2009) (as
amended) [hereinafter STL RPE] (emphasis added).
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provision appears to be the key difference between the rules of the STL
and the other ad hoc penal tribunals.2' Essentially, the STL introduces a
second qualifying phrase to the right to defend oneself, thereby granting
the judges greater leeway to restrict the enjoyment of that right. Under
the Rome Statute scheme discussed above, the chamber may limit the
exercise of this broad right based on the authority explicitly conferred by
the primary statute rather than the subordinate rules of procedure and
evidence as envisaged under the STL.
Nevertheless, the language contained in the ICTY and ICTR
Statutes seem simple and clear enough. It is, after all, essentially the
same language used in at least three international conventions defining
the human rights of accused persons.22 Unfortunately, international
criminal courts have not found the application of this language easy or
satisfying. The problems the pioneering ICTY and ICTR have
experienced in dealing with disruptive and self-representing defendants
is at least partially responsible for the change in statutory or regulatory
language employed by the ICC and other tribunals such as the STL. 3
C. Issues that Arise for Self-Representing Defendants and Counsel in
International Tribunals
There are many aspects to the question of how to appropriately
handle these types of situations, most of which have been faced by an
international court at least once. Issues that have arisen include the
following: handling requests to appear pro se at various stages of trial,24
21. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia state in Rule 45ter that "[t]he Trial Chamber may, if it decides
that it is in the interests of justice, instruct the Registrar to assign a counsel to represent
the interests of the accused." ICTY R. P. & EVID. 45ter (B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 17
(Dec. 7, 1999) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTY RPE]. Rule 45 quater of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure and Evidence is identical to the ICTY
rule. See ICTR R. P. & EviD. 45 quater (Oct. 1, 2009) (as amended) [hereinafter ICTR
RPE]. The Special Court for Sierra Leone Rules of Procedure and Evidence states in
Rule 45(B)(ii) that the defense office shall provide "legal assistance as ordered by the
Special Court in accordance with Rule 61, if the accused does not have sufficient means
to pay for it, as the interests of justice may so require." SCSL R. P. & EVID. 45(B)(ii)
(Apr. 12, 2002) (as amended) [hereinafter SCSL RPE].
22. See ICCPR, supra note 11; ECHR, supra note 13; ACHR, supra note 14.
23. See generally Michael Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive
Defendants and Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Tribunals, 39 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 155 (2006-07); Mark Ellis, The Saddam Trial: Challenges to Meeting
International Standards of Fairness with Regard to the Defense, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 171 (2006-07).
24. See generally Prosecutor v. Krajignik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Decision on
Admission of Documents Tendered by Mr. Krajignik (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Aug. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-125,
Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation Under
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determining the extent of responsibilities and powers of standby and
amicus counsel, 2 allowing standby or amicus counsel to take over the
case when a defendant is removed from court or absent,26 pre- and mid-
trial requests for a change to either standby or appointed counsel,2 7
disruption caused by retained counsel,28 the extent of public legal
resources and advice that should be given to self-represented
defendants,29 and other related issues.
In making decisions regarding the scope of counsel's role in a trial,
international courts must balance many different, and sometimes
conflicting, rights. These include the right of the defendant to a fair trial,
the right to an expeditious trial, the rights of all those participating in the
trial, including the accused and the victims, and the seemingly
conflicting absolute right to counsel and equally fundamental right to
refuse the assistance of counsel.3 ° In addition, all of these specific rights
are viewed within the context of the broad and amorphous concept of
"interests of justice" as indicated by the statutory provisions above.31
Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court (June 8, 2004) [hereinafter Norman,
Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-Representation];
Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T-285, Decision on Appeal against Decision
on Withdrawal of Counsel (Nov. 23, 2004).
25. See generally Prosecutor v. Karad~id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR73.6, Decision on
Radovan Karadlid's Appeal from Decision on Motion to Vacate Appointment of Richard
Harvey (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 12, 2010); Prosecutor v.
Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial
Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Miloevi6, Decision on Interlocutory
Appeal of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel];
Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Order Concerning Appointment of Standby
Counsel and Delayed Commencement of Trial (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 25, 2006).
26. See generally Prosecutor v. Karadli6, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on
Appointment of Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter Karadli6, Decision on Appointment of
Counsel and Order on Further Trial Proceedings].
27. See generally Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-97-21-T, Decision
on Ntahboli's Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel (June 22, 2001).
28. See generally Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-T,
Prosecution Opening Statement, Transcript of Record (June 4, 2007) [hereinafter Taylor,
Transcript of Record]; Scharf, supra note 23, at 164.
29. See egelj, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav egelj with His Defence, supra note 4, 28-30; Prosecutor v. Jankovi6,
Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision Following Registrar's Notification of Radovan
Stankovi6's Request for Self-Representation, 24 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Aug. 19, 2005).
30. See Nina Jorgenson, The Problem of Self-Representation at International
Criminal Tribunals: Striking a Balance Between Fairness and Effectiveness, 4 J. INT'L
CR1M. JUST. 64, 69 (2006).
31. Gbran Sluiter, Fairness and the Interests of Justice: Illusive Concepts in the
Miloievi6 Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 9, 12 (2005).
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As several appellate courts in some national jurisdictions have
emphasized, in these types of cases, the court must walk a "thin line...
between improperly allowing a defendant to proceed pro se, thereby
violating the right to counsel," and improperly requiring the defendant to
proceed with counsel, thereby violating his right to defend himself.32 In
regards to the role of standby counsel and/or amicus curiae, this line
becomes difficult to tread because standby counsel could violate the
defendant's rights by acting either too little or too much during a trial.
Defendants in the United States, for example, have appealed trials in
which they appeared pro se by claiming both that standby counsel
interfered too much (violating their right to defend themselves) 33 and that
a court's use of standby or appointed counsel was insufficient (violating
their right to the protections of counsel).34
Considering the frequency with which the landmark U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Faretta v. California,35 (establishing the right to self-
representation in the United States), is cited by every international
tribunal,3 6 these same problems often arise in international settings. The
bad news for international criminal justice is that all of these competing
rights and interests make it nearly impossible to create hard and fast rules
for the role of counsel at any particular trial.37 The good news is that
balancing these interests allows international courts to learn from the past
and tweak their assessment of these rights, thereby redefining the
appropriate role of counsel in factually and legally complex international
criminal trials. As they tend to construe the text of the fair trial
provisions contained in their instruments in a manner that accords with
the letter but also the spirit of the rights enshrined by international human
32. United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 559 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Fields v.
Murray, 49 F.3d 1024, 1029 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Cross v. United States,
893 F.2d 1287, 1290 (11 th Cir.1990)).
33. See generally McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
34. Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008).
35. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Segelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment
of Counsel, 15 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 21, 2006) [hereinafter
Segej, Decision on Assignment of Counsel]; Milogevi6, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal
of the Trial Chamber's Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, supra note 25,
11; Barayagwiza, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw, supra note 4,
(Gunawardana, J., concurring); Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL 2004-15-T,
Prosecution's Submissions to Gbao's Appeal from Decision on Withdraw of Counsel of
6 July 2004, 25 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-
04-15-PT-RUF/SCSL-04-15-T-248.pdf.
37. In fact, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the ICTY have been amended
over 40 times since 1993 to account for shifts in the Court's attempt to balance fairness
and expediency. See FAUSTO POCAR, INT'L Ass'N OF PROCEDURAL L., COMMON AND
CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS IN THE ICTY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: DOES OIL BLEND WITH
WATER? 3-4 (2009).
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rights, these relatively new tribunals have breathed life in otherwise
vague human rights provisions. These international tribunals have done
so in light of problems and experiences garnered from concrete criminal
trials at the national level.
Courts of international law, however, also have more leeway than
most national jurisdictions recognizing the right to self-representation.
The procedures of international criminal law are usually a blend of two
major Western legal traditions: (1) the common law/Anglo-American
law and (2) civil law or Continental/Romano-Germanic systems.38
While the right to represent oneself is almost unanimously recognized by
countries operating with a predominantly common law legal system,
countries with a mostly civil law orientation do not always recognize
such a right.39 Various reasons exist for this distinction; for this article's
purposes, however, the most relevant reason is that many civilian
systems mandatorily assign defense counsel in criminal cases because it
is deemed to be in the best interests of justice for the accused to be
assisted by counsel.4 °
Not all civil law traditions structure the mandatory assignment of a
lawyer in criminal cases the same way. 41 For some civil law countries,
like Italy, counsel must always be present; whereas, for other countries
such as Germany, this requirement of counsel is confined only to cases
where the accused is charged with serious crimes.42 Other civil law
countries occupy an intermediate twilight zone between these two
extremes. For instance, in the practice of criminal courts in France and
Belgium, 43 counsel will be imposed only if the accused does not initially
choose counsel. This discrepancy in the general attitudes of
"inquisitorial" civil law systems, compared to "adversarial" common law
38. See Michael Scharf & Christopher Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an
International Right to Self-Representation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 3, 15 (2005). See generally Gideon Boas, Self-Representation before the ICTY: A
Case for Reform, 9 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 53 (2011).
39. See Segelj, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, supra note 36, 20.
40. See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. 1T-02-54-T, Reasons for Decision on
Assignment of Defence Counsel, 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Sept. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Miloievi6, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence
Counsel].
41. egel], Decision on Assignment of Counsel, supra note 36, 21; 9e~e", Decision
on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Segelj with His
Defence, supra note 4, 16.
42. See STRAHPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7,
1987, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 2646, as amended, § 140, para. 1, sentence 2 (Ger.).
43. See CODE DE PROCEDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PEN.] arts. 274, 317 (Fr.); CODE
D'INsTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.CR.] art. 294 (BeIg.).
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systems, requires a broad, big-picture balancing.' Thus, while
international criminal procedure remains a work in progress, the
international penal tribunal must seek to reconcile underlying
philosophical differences between the national legal principles that form
the basis of the procedural decisions and rules defining the role of the
parties, especially the accused and his counsel in a criminal trial. 45
To understand how the role of counsel is defined at the international
level thus requires an understanding of two intertwined balancing
processes. The first is the balancing of the uneven blend of common and
civil law principles that resulted in the emergence of a mixed system of
international criminal procedure. This mixed procedural system provides
a generally credible institutional apparatus within which to pursue the
prosecution of the types of heinous and large-scale crimes when
available national level legal remedies are either unavailable or
inadequate.46  The second is the balancing of aforementioned
considerations raised by the largely adversarial criminal trials likely
taking place a considerable distance from the scene of the alleged crimes
on a very public and visible stage involving high profile and usually
astute defendants.
By first recognizing and considering each of these complex
balancing processes and the situations in which they arise at the
international level, I hope to (re)define the lines for the appointment of
counsel. I similarly hope to advance understanding of the best practices
available to international penal courts with respect to standby, amicus, or
assigned counsel in specific cases where a defendant chooses to defend
himself personally or is disruptive.
III. COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES ON THE RIGHT TO
SELF-REPRESENTATION AND APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
A. Differing Theories about the Purpose of Criminal Trials
The use of counsel in the common and civil law systems diverges
rather noticeably. This divergence has been attributed to the differing
theories of trial used in each system. In the civil law system, where the
judge acts in an investigatory role to find his own route to the truth,
44. For a discussion of the different types of truths sought, see SALVATORE ZAPPALA,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 16 (2003).
45. See Milogevi, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, supra
note 40, 50.
46. For a discussion of the benefits from mixing common and civil procedural norms
into a unique international system, see generally PocAR, supra note 37.
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counsel is not an essential guarantor of a defendant's rights a7  By
contrast, in the common law system, where the judge is deemed a neutral
arbiter or referee between two supposedly equal adversaries, counsel
bears primary responsibility for protecting the rights of his accused client
by exploring every recognized avenue to ensure that the accused receives
due process.4 8 It may therefore seem odd that the right to forgo the
assistance of counsel and represent oneself is a normal feature of
common law systems where counsel's role is a considerably more
important facet of a fair trial.
Civil law systems generally do not recognize a defendant's right to
conduct his own defense, despite, or perhaps because, defense counsel
plays a much less significant role in determining the outcome of the trial.
In addition to the routine and mandatory assignment of counsel in serious
criminal cases, another explanation seems to be that, in the civilian
system, judges are simply applying comprehensive statutory provisions.
There is little room for interpretation about what the law is or what the
law should be. In contrast, the common law tradition is typically
assumed to rest upon judges interpreting community norms and using
their discretion to apply general principles found in previous precedent.
Because there is a greater likelihood of policy considerations and
discussion of how the law should be read in a common law court,
especially due to the jury's role in adjudicating felony level offenses,
there is a greater emphasis placed upon defendant autonomy. The
defendant could theoretically persuade the judge and jury to see things a
particular way.
Furthermore, in common law systems, counsel-primarily through
the selection of witnesses and cross-examination of the other side's
witnesses--effectively contribute to shaping the facts and outcome of the
trial as ultimately determined by the jury. At the same time, with his
professional legal training, the competent defense lawyer is in most cases
best able to advise his client who, essentially, may exercise his legal right
to hold the prosecution to proof of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt
by not introducing any evidence in return. In the civil law tradition,
there is a much smaller persuasive aspect to a criminal trial, and the need
to preserve defendant autonomy is minimized given the seemingly
mechanical application of law to fact that is emphasized. Because
international courts have thus far adopted a system that is essentially
adversarial rather than inquisitorial in nature, the common law emphasis
47. See Rosemary Byrne, The New Public International Lawyer and the Hidden Art
ofInternational Criminal Trial Practice, 25 CONN. J. INT'L L. 243, 249 (2010).
48. Seeid.at261.
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on individual autonomy has largely prevailed in international criminal
trials focused on ensuring fair trials-at least during the early cases.49
In civil law systems, the presence of counsel is not necessarily seen
as divesting the defendant of his right to speak in court on his own behalf
due to the assistance of a lawyer. Conversely, common law courts tend
to take the view that the presence of counsel essentially overrides the
rights of the individual to directly participate so long as his lawyer, the
expert so to speak, is present and representing him in court.
Furthermore, the extremely technical rules governing the admissibility of
evidence, a significant characteristic of common law trials that have been
largely abandoned in international criminal trials, may also dampen the
idea of direct defendant participation in procedurally complex trials.
B. Principles Shaping the Use of Counsel in Common Law and Civil
Law Systems
It is useful to consider the principles shaping the common law rules
on use of standby and amicus counsel before assessing how they
compare to the "interests of justice" principles frequently invoked in
international criminal trials.
In R. v. Woodward,50 an early case addressing this issue in the
United Kingdom, the English Court of Criminal Appeal held that a
defendant had a right to present his own defense to a jury, and the court
could not force counsel upon him against his will. This brief opinion
highlights two key considerations. First is the explicit reference to the
jury, to whom the defense case will be presented. Second is the
defendant's will, which the court may not violate by appointing counsel.
These same two considerations reappeared in the U.S. Supreme
Court 40 years later in McKaskle v. Wiggins,51 in which the Court
established the limits upon standby counsel action during a trial. The
McKaskle Court indicated that standby counsel could autonomously take
whatever action he deemed appropriate, provided that two important
limitations are respected. 2 First, the accused must maintain actual
control over the case presented, and, second, the participation of standby
counsel cannot taint the jury's perception that the accused is conducting
or controlling his own defense.53
49. See Miloevie, Order Inviting Designation of Amicus Curiae, supra note 2.
50. R.v. Woodward, [1944] K.B. 118, 29 Crim. App. 159.
51. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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In the leading Faretta case,54 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
the importance of individual autonomy. The Court reasoned that, since
the individual alone would bear the penalties and consequences for the
effectiveness of the defense, the decision on how to proceed is rightfully
placed in his hands.55 The Court also reasoned that a defendant is
presumed innocent and, thus, the right to autonomous control over his
defense cannot be stripped away; to find otherwise would render the
defendant "imprisoned in his privileges.
56
In R. v. Swain,57 the Supreme Court of Canada similarly identified
respect for individual autonomy as the basis for its conclusion that an
adversarial system requires the court to allow the defendant to control his
own defense. The respect for individual autonomy recognized by the
British, American, and Canadian courts is a frequently cited basis for
common law decisions restricting the role of counsel at a defendant's
request. The Ontario Court of Appeals, however, provided perhaps the
most colorful and illuminating statement on the nature of the common
law system in Phillips v. Ford Motor Company:
58
A trial is not intended to be a scientific exploration with the presiding
judge assuming the role of a research director; it is a forum
established for the purpose of providing justice for the litigants. 59
Although this statement shows a common law judge's rejection of an
investigative role, a civil law judge would be much more likely to
embrace the idea that the trial is a scientific exploration for the truth.
This quote underscores the most basic distinction between the two
different legal traditions. In the common law system, the goal of a
criminal trial is to dispense justice, although that may be variedly
defined; whereas, in the civil law system, the goal of such proceedings is
to establish the truth.6 °
This fundamental philosophical difference becomes clearer
following an examination of civil law systems and the codes governing
them. As a general rule, there is much less importance placed on the
notion of a defendant's autonomy in the civil law tradition. In
comparing France to the United States, for example, there are generally
54. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
55. See id. at 834.
56. Id.
57. R. v. Swain, [1991] S.C.R. 933 (Can.).
58. Phillips v. Ford Motor Co. (1971), 18 D.L.R. 3d 641 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
59. Id.
60. See Byrne, supra note 47, at 255.
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greater limitations placed upon plea-bargaining in France.61 The pre-trial
investigatory process is not nearly as restricted by defendant's rights, and
evidence is less frequently excluded from trial.62 Still, the emphasis on
an efficient finding of truth in France is not limited to pre-trial procedure.
In France, written briefs submitted to the bench are of much greater
importance than in the United States.63 This is reportedly because, in
civilian systems, the trial does not play the central role in criminal justice
that it does in the common law.64 Due to the extensive pre-trial judicial
investigation and the emphasis on written submissions to the court, the
trial does not play nearly as large a determinative function in deciding
the outcome of the case. 65 Rather than being a forum within which to
hear and evaluate all the evidence, the trial is merely another means by
which the judge obtains further evidence that has not already been
presented. This doctrinal attitude about the place of trials in a larger
process demonstrates the court-centric rather than party-centric emphasis
the civil law system employs in determining the outcome of a particular
criminal case.
Yet, as important as it is, this difference should not be overstated.
In fact, even the common law acknowledges and tries to address the
tensions that lead the civilian system to its more pragmatic approach.
For instance, as Chief Justice Burger observed in dissent in Faretta, the
trial judge in a common law court is not simply an "automaton" to ensure
adherence to technical evidence rules but also someone responsible for
ensuring that justice, in its broadest sense, is achieved in every criminal
trial so that public confidence in the system is not undermined.66 Thus,
the dissenter warned that the criminal justice system should not be
perverted and transformed into an "instrument of self-destruction" by
essentially providing a rope for frustrated or foolish defendants to hang
themselves in society's full view, or worse, with its complicity or
67
acquiescence.
61. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Non-Adversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42
MD. L. REV. 131, 161 (1983); see also POCAR, supra note 37, at 3 (noting that the
absence of plea-bargaining is a characteristic of most civil law systems, and its absence
was one of the aspects of the civil law that was adopted by the ICTY from the beginning).
62. See Tomlinson, supra note 61, at 161.
63. JEAN-FRANCOIS POUDRET & StBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 559 (2d ed. 2007).
64. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 61.
65. See POCAR, supra note 37, at 7 (asserting that pre-trial written submissions are
starting to play a larger role in international trials but still do not reach the same level of
thoroughness as a civil law dossier).
66. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 839 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The decreased focus on defendant autonomy and increased focus on
the independent inquiry of the court is exemplified by the civil law rules
regarding the assignment of counsel. Consider the German Code of
Criminal Procedure, which broadly defines when the assignment of
counsel is mandatory and further stipulates:
In other cases the presiding judge shall appoint defense counsel upon
application or ex officio if the assistance of defense counsel appears
necessary because of the seriousness of the offence, or because of the
difficult factual or legal situation, or if it is evident that the accused
cannot defend himself, particularly where an attorney has been
assigned to the aggrieved person pursuant to Sections 397a and 406g
subsections (3) and (4).68
This provision grants the judge a great deal of discretion in
assigning defense counsel to the accused, even in situations where
counsel is not already mandatory.69 The judge's authority to impose
counsel upon a criminal defendant also seems to stem from the civil
law's focus on truth finding over resolution seeking. The resolution-
seeking court must preserve respect for individual autonomy in order to
guarantee confidence from the parties involved that both sides were
given a fair chance to present their positions and that the winner was
more convincing. The truth-seeking court is less concerned with the
perceptions of the parties involved in any particular case and more
concerned with the general aim for accurate decisions in most instances.
The greater discretion of judges to impose defense counsel against
the wishes of an accused in civilian systems can also be attributed to the
more active role the judge takes during the course of a criminal trial.
Because the judge is personally questioning witnesses and making
decisions about the direction of the trial, appointing counsel has
significant benefits to the judge in executing his responsibilities. In a
common law system, it is easier for the judge to exercise his role as a
"neutral" arbiter when dealing with counsel rather than the defendant
directly. The increased power the judge wields over counsel through
sanctions, penalties and fines, has less impact upon the accused.70 In the
civil law system, however, the assignment of counsel is more than just
convenient for judges. Because the judge must determine what
happened, requiring counsel from both sides to assist allows the judge
greater certainty about both the facts of the case and the decision the
court will reach. It seems to follow that the underlying goals and the
68. STRAHPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] 2646, as amended, § 140, para. 2 (Ger.).
69. See, e.g., gegelj, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, supra note 36, 21.
70. See Scharf, supra note 23, at 161.
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structure of each criminal justice system dictates the divergences in
appointing counsel between the common and civil law traditions.
In any case, given the not entirely compatible goals of truth and
justice, it is up to the international criminal law to shape a shared system
of criminal procedure and professional roles that reflects the values of
both the civil and common law.7' Of course, both truth and justice play
an extremely important role in international criminal law given the
reasons behind its implementation. International criminal law, although
rather too ambitiously, was initially couched as a way to "end...
impunity" for some of the worst crimes otherwise not prosecuted in
national courts. 72  As if that grand objective is not enough, the
international community also envisaged that the creation of these courts
will also help establish a historical record and thereby foster national
healing and reconciliation in countries torn apart by age-old ethnic
animosities and violent crimes committed on a vast scale.73
To achieve the goals of ending impunity and fostering national
healing, both truth and justice are vital factors. Revealing the facts about
the crimes that the guilty are charged with committing is vital to allowing
countries to learn and perhaps even, with the passage of time, to move
past the atrocities. In this sense, the civil law focus on finding and
proclaiming absolute truth with regard to an individual's actions is
seemingly more desirable as a way to facilitate a country's acceptance of
the legitimacy of international proceedings. In fact, this pragmatic
posture seems to make sense since international criminal law essentially
treads on the toes of states in an area that was classically deemed their
exclusive preserve: the exercise of criminal jurisdiction that is both an
attribute and a function of sovereignty.
Alternatively, a focus on justice bears just as much importance for
the goals of international justice and the perceptions surrounding it. It is
important that international tribunals not lose their legitimacy in making
decisions by being perceived as "western" or "winner's" justice only. To
avoid this perception, fairness to the defendant and respect for the
defendant's autonomy during trial is essential. It therefore becomes clear
that, for an international penal court to have even the hope that it will
accomplish its tall primary and secondary goals, the procedure of trial
must maintain a focus on capturing both truth and justice. In order to do
71. Byrne, supra note 47.
72. Rome Statute, supra note 16, pmbl.
73. See S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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that, a blending and melding of common and civil law concepts and
methods in concrete cases appears paramount.
74
IV. APPLICATION OF COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW APPROACHES IN
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
International courts in any given trial can face numerous potential
decisions regarding the role of counsel. These decisions include
questions about the amount of time or resources a defendant will have to
prepare for trial or how much funding a defendant will be allowed for
hiring a defense team. However, the most frequent and most significant
decisions that face international criminal tribunals tend to center around
three major questions:
(1) Will or should the court appoint counsel for the defendant,
or allow him to conduct his own defense?
(2) Will or should the court appoint standby counsel and/or
amicus curiae, and, if so, what role should they be given?
(3) What is the appropriate response in emergency situations
when the defendant (and/or his counsel) is either absent or
so disruptive that they need to be removed from court?
Both the growing body of international criminal law and numerous
national jurisdictions have already confronted these questions many
times over. Each question can be analyzed at the international level by
considering the balancing of interests by the court, as well as the goals
and procedures employed by common and civil law systems at the
national level.
A. Should the Court Appoint Counsel for the Defendant or Allow Him
to Represent Himself?
In considering whether the court should permit the defendant to
represent himself or to appoint counsel to act on the accused's behalf,
even over his objection if necessary, the Miloevi6 trial provides an
excellent case study, although it set a precedent on self-representation
74. Although, on the other hand, unlike customary law or Islamic legal traditions,
the more prevalent common and civil law systems are typically associated with the West.
For a case-specific discussion of this idea, see, e.g., Linda E. Carter, Justice and
Reconciliation on Trial: The Gacaca Proceedings in Rwanda, 14 NEw ENG. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 41 (2007).
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that has come under scathing criticism over time.75  In allowing
Milogevid's initial request to represent himself, the judges, as discussed
at the outset of this article, seemed primarily concerned with respecting
the defendant's rights and guaranteeing that there was no question that
the tribunal was granting him a fair trial.76 The Trial Chamber, in an
August 30, 2001 ruling, reasoned that Milo~evi6's assertion of the right
was both timely and unequivocal and that Article 21 (4)(d) guaranteed his
right to conduct his own defense." The judges then appointed three
amicus curiae to ensure that Milogevid's right to defend himself was not
disturbed by the court.
Still, the appointment of amici was not the end of the court's
decision regarding the role of counsel in that case. The judges had to
confront the question about what should be done about Milogevi6's right
to self-representation on at least three subsequent occasions. The
prosecutor, who had urged the court to appoint defense counsel over
Milogevi6's wishes in their initial ruling, waited just over a year to again
urge the Trial Chamber to take action.7"
In an oral ruling on December 18, 2002, the Trial Chamber again
rejected the prosecutor's request but promised to keep the matter under
review.79 In September 2003, the prosecution sought a hearing to
address how the court should proceed in light of the disruptions to the
trial posed by Milogevid's poor health.80 The judges, faced with this
issue for the third time, issued a ruling reducing the number of days the
court would sit to three per week, giving him time to rest and recover in
between days in court.8 1 Finally, after further disruptions, numerous
submissions from the prosecutor and amici counsel, and health
evaluations by three different physicians, the chamber decided in an oral
ruling on September 2, 2004, that Milogevi6's health required them to
appoint defense counsel so that the trial could proceed.82
At each of these four points of the trial, the Trial Chamber sought to
balance a number of considerations in its determination of whether to
assign counsel for Milogevid. In its explanation of the reasons for the
75. See Boas, supra note 38, at 55 (criticizing the ICTY approach to self-
representation, first developed in Miloevik, as "a poor legal ruling" that has led to "less
than satisfactory" and "farcical" results in later case law).
76. See Miloievik, Reasons for Decision on the Prosecution Motion Concerning
Assignment of Counsel, supra note 8, 3.
77. See id.
78. See Milogevi6, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, supra
note 40, 7.
79. Id. 8.
80. Id. 9.
81. Id. 10.
82. Id. l.
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oral ruling on December 18, 2002, the court provided two primary
justifications for refusing to impose counsel on Milogevid. The judges
felt that, since the ICTY was essentially operating on the adversarial
model for its trials, it was necessarily required to follow accepted
common law rules regarding the use of counsel at trial.83 The judges
cited the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Faretta and reasoned that
depriving the defendant of his right to represent himself would
effectively be depriving him of the right to put forth his own defense.
84
The chamber, in reaching this conclusion, drew parallels between the
American common law system and the rules established by the ICCPR
and ECHR, as well as the statute for the ICTY itself.85 The court thus
determined that, as a matter of principle, the ICTY rules established an
adversarial system to preserve the rights of the defendant and to ensure a
just trial occurred. 86 Interestingly, likely unwittingly, the court largely
ignored case law from the civil law system that might have been
incorporated into their reasoning to reach a more reasonable and
balanced result as between the rights of the accused and the tribunal's
right to render credible justice.
The Trial Chamber attempted to be pragmatic in their second
explanation for their ruling. They determined that, if they imposed
counsel on Milogevid and then he refused to cooperate, they would either
have to cut the defendant out of the trial altogether or relegate assigned
counsel to a role no greater than that of the amici counsel.87 The judges
noted that they already had three lawyers assisting the court and did not
want to raise fairness concerns by denying Milogevid the right to
participate in his trial.88 One could legitimately question whether the
chamber was too deferential toward the defendant considering that other
interests, such as those of the victims and justice, were also at stake. But,
in civil law systems, the accused is still typically allowed to participate in
the trial by intervening to cross-examine witnesses after counsel and the
judge are finished with their questions. 89 The irony, of course, is that
civilian systems would have imposed counsel at this stage. It follows
that, instead of capitulating to the defendant's threat that he will not
participate if counsel is imposed upon him, the chamber could have
83. See Milogevi6, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, supra
note 40, 45.
84. Id.
85. See id. 22-32.
86. Id.
87. Id. 3.
88. Id. 3-4.
89. Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of the International Criminal Tribunals in
Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights, 8 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 1,21 (2009).
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offered him a limited right to speak in court, on a case-by-case basis,
with the leave of the presiding judge. This alternative could have been
conditioned on the undertaking that he would comport himself with the
court's orders. The ICTY has subsequently used this approach in some
later cases.
In any event, the balancing of interests had changed for the court by
September 2004. In that decision, the Trial Chamber highlighted its
fundamental duty to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. The court
determined that allowing Milogevid to proceed without counsel
jeopardized the completion of the trial in a reasonable time, if at all. 90
After granting concession after concession so that Milogevid could
exercise a right the court considered fundamental to the adversarial
process, the judges finally reached the conclusion that the overall
fairness of the trial process needed to take precedence over guarantees of
fairness to the defendant personally.91
Perhaps as a signal of the shift from an absolute to a qualified right
of self-representation, the Milogevi6 Trial Chamber's September 2004
decision did not cite U.S. case law and, instead, the court supported its
ruling with citations to the Barayagwiza case decided by the ICTR and
the Norman case from the SCSL.92 Those international decisions gave
less latitude to the defendant, much like continental systems do, favoring
instead a focus on the big picture desire to dispense justice. This shift in
Miloevi6 from common law to civil law type attitudes can be explained
in part by the change in composition of the bench because Presiding
Judge Richard May resigned for health reasons. Nevertheless, this swing
of the pendulum and adoption of case law from other tribunals helped the
judges justify their decision to curtail Milogevi's right to represent
himself in the greater interests of justice.
In Barayagwiza, the ICTR did not have to decide whether to
appoint defense counsel, but rather, the issue turned on whether to let
assigned counsel withdraw from the case. The defendant, Barayagwiza,
had proclaimed that the ICTR lacked the degree of independence and
impartiality required to hold a fair trial and had refused to attend court
because the proceedings were, in his view, a sham.93  He had also
instructed his assigned counsel not to attend the trial or any of the court
proceedings on his behalf.94 This refusal had prompted assigned counsel
90. See Milogevi6, Reasons for Decision on Assignment of Defence Counsel, supra
note 40, 65-66.
91. Id.
92. Id. 39-41.
93. See Barayagwiza, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw, supra note
4, 12.
94. Id.
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to file a motion to withdraw due to their stated ethical obligation to
follow the instructions of their client in decisions about presenting the
defense. 95
The ICTR Trial Chamber, interestingly presided over by a judge
from South Africa's mixed legal system, unanimously ruled that assigned
counsel did not only owe a duty to the defendant but also to the
tribunal. 96 Part of assigned counsel's greater duty towards the court
included ensuring a fair and expeditious trial, and defending their client's
interests in an adversarial trial, with or without instructions on how to do
so. 97 The judges reasoned that, given the gravity of the charges, they had
a higher duty to ensure the protection of the defendant's rights in light of
what was at stake for him.98 Consequently, their obligation to protect the
rights of the defendant and to maintain the overall fairness of the
proceedings trumped Barayagwiza's assertion of the right to control his
defense. In fact, the judges felt that this duty even displaced the duty of
defense counsel-who were also officers of the court-to listen
exclusively to Barayagwiza. 99
In a compelling concurring opinion to the denial of counsel's
request to withdraw, Judge Gunawardana, the common law judge, relied
on U.S. case law to suggest what might have been the better solution.'00
He wrote that he would have allowed assigned counsel to withdraw and
appoint standby counsel for Barayagwiza instead.1' This approach
would have avoided the entangling of obligations between the
defendant's counsel as lawyers for the accused and the duties that they
owed the court in their capacity as defense counsel. This approach
would have also permitted counsel in court to represent Barayagwiza in
proceeding along the best course of action, even in light of contrary
orders from the defendant. In his view, the interests of justice dictated
that the independence of standby counsel be preserved over the ethical
obligations of appointed counsel.'0 2
The Norman case before the SCSL involved a defendant attempting
to follow Milogevif's example and proceed to trial without counsel. The
95. See id. 17.
96. Id. 21. Judge Pillay (South Africa), former president of the ICTR and current
UN commissioner for human rights, was the presiding judge of Trial Chamber I. The
other judges, Erik Mose and Osaka de Zoysa, were from Norway and Sri Lanka,
respectively.
97. See id.
98. Id. 23.
99. Id. 24.
100. See Barayagwiza, Decision on Defense Counsel Motion to Withdraw, supra note
4 (Gunawardana, J., concurring).
101. Id. (Gunawardana, J., concurring).
102. Id.
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Trial Chamber of the SCSL, however, rejected Norman's request to
proceed on his own for two main reasons. The first reason was the
timing of Norman's request, which was made on the first day of trial.' °3
The Court ruled that granting the defendant's request to represent himself
before the tribunal would require an enormous delay in the proceedings
to both give him time to prepare and then conduct the trial unrepresented
by counsel. 1°4 The second reason was that Norman was not in the case
alone; he was jointly being tried with two others. In those circumstances,
the SCSL Trial Chamber determined that permitting Norman to proceed
without any assistance of counsel would result in extreme unfairness to
his two co-defendants, both of whom had retained counsel for the trial."'
In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered a number of
factors including the necessity of counsel to a fair and expeditious trial,
the extreme complexity of the case in question, the public interest in
having the trial continue in an expeditious manner, and the potential
disruption of the proceedings arising from Norman's request. 10 6 In the
end, the chamber determined that the defendant would be required to
accept standby counsel if he wanted to proceed in conducting his own
defense. 0 7 The interests of justice, the Chamber held, required that the
judges not allow Norman to continue entirely without any legal
assistance.'0 8
Just before the start of his trial, on July 6, 2004, in the same Sierra
Leone Tribunal, another defendant--Gbao-applied to terminate his
counsel on the basis that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the SCSL
and did not therefore wish to participate in his case. 10 9 The Trial
Chamber ruled that his explanation offered for seeking the withdrawal of
his counsel was insufficient to constitute the exceptional circumstances
required by the rules to grant his request. 11 The court reasoned that,
after an examination of the circumstances of his case, the interest of
justice would not be served by permitting Gbao to be unrepresented
before the Court."' The judges considered it their duty to safeguard his
103. Norman, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self-
Representation, supra note 24, 17-20.
104. Id.
105. Id. 13-16.
106. Id. 26.
107. Id. 32.
108. Id. 30.
109. Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-AR73, Decision on Appeal against
Decision on Withdrawal of Counsel (Nov. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/scsl/eng/decisions/2004.11.23_Prosecutorv.SesayKallon
Gbao.PDF.
110. d 29.
111. Id. 46.
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rights and the integrity of the proceedings by insisting that counsel
represent him.' 12 Furthermore, the accused, according to the Chamber,
could not waive his right to a fair and expeditious trial. 113 The court
therefore ordered the defense team to represent him to the finality of the
case. Gbao then sent a declaration to the judges the next day, indicating
that he was boycotting court. He then appealed the decision. 114 The
Appeals Chamber upheld the trial level decision."1 Interestingly, both
groups of judges at the trial and on appeal implied that the right to
counsel cannot be viewed in isolation from other rights that the
defendant enjoyed. The right to have counsel had to be counterbalanced
against Gbao's right to an expeditious trial.
The SCSL is also the site of another relatively recent decision on
this topic, which occurred at the outset of the Taylor case in June 2007.
The accused, former President of Liberia Charles Taylor, did not appear
in court on the day of the prosecution's opening statement.116 Taylor did
not believe that his defense team had been given adequate time,
resources, or personnel by the SCSL to hold a fair trial. He therefore
dismissed his entire defense team, refusing to allow them to represent
him in court, and wrote a letter announcing his intention to appear in his
own himself.
117
In response to what it later termed a "boycott" of the proceedings,
the chamber ordered that lead counsel remain to represent the accused
Taylor in his absence. 1 8  Taylor's defense counsel, much like
Barayagwiza's lawyers at the ICTR, retorted that it would be unethical
for him to purport to represent Taylor without instructions and against
his former client's wishes. Khan was wrong on the applicable law in the
sense that the code of conduct in the tribunal trumps the rules of his
national bar. Under the Court's rules, he was required to follow the
judicial order whose effect would have been to change his status from
administratively assigned counsel to court appointed counsel. But he did
not relent, even after he was threatened with potential contempt of court
if he departed the courtroom because of violation of the chamber's order
to remain and to represent Taylor."19
Left without both a defense counsel and without a defendant, the
court appointed duty counsel from the Office of the Principal Defender, a
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. 44, 48, 50.
115. Id. 53, 60.
116. Taylor, Transcript of Record, supra note 28, at 244 9 10-12.
117. Id. at 250 15-29, 251 1-8.
118. Id. at259 1-18.
119. Id. at 263 2-3.
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lawyer employed by the SCSL Defense Office, to take over the defense
case temporarily for the duration of the opening statement.1 20 Consistent
with that tribunal's practice, duty counsel had been attached to the case,
but only in a limited role prior to that moment. This implied that he did
not have access to case materials, including the prosecution discovery,
since private counsel had already been provisionally assigned to
represent the defendant. 121  The court's decision raised important
questions regarding how the sole staff member of a poorly resourced
Defense Office in The Hague Sub-Office of the SCSL could face an
array of experienced prosecutors to assist the accused during his self-
representation. The decision also exposed the issue alluded to above
when senior court officials purported to instruct the court-appointed duty
counsel on his role in a way that raised concerns about the overall
fairness of the process towards the defendant and ultimately led to his
decision to resign from the tribunal.
Ultimately, Trial Chamber II did not permit Taylor's request to
conduct his own defense. In a seemingly hasty June 25, 2007 ruling, at
least when compared to the ICTY chamber's cautious approach to the
interpretation of that right in Miloevi, the three SCSL judges, all from
common law jurisdictions, ruled that a defendant choosing to represent
himself had to be present in court in order for the right to be validly
asserted. 122 The court basically refused to allow Taylor to choose if and
when to appear before them and instead required that a new defense team
be composed to handle his defense case. 123 This decision raised concerns
about what judges should do in such circumstances where the absence of
a defendant is apparently predicated on the belief that he would not get a
fair trial, but at the same time, was clearly not spurious because it was a
protest of the tribunal registrar's decision not to afford him adequate
resources to prepare his defense. The added difficulty, from the
defendant's perspective, was the chamber's abject refusal to give counsel
sufficient time to prepare his case before the opening of his scheduled
trial. In other words, at what point is a supposedly self-representing
defendant like Taylor allowed to boycott court proceedings to make a
point without risking termination of his prima facie right to defend
himself in person?
120. Id at267 10-11.
121. For example, duty counsel, as the Head of The Hague Sub-Office of the
Principal Defender in the SCSL, did not have access to disclosure materials from the
prosecution, nor was he involved in the defense strategy prior to the events of June 4,
2007. In the interest of transparency, this author was the Court appointed counsel for
Taylor.
122. Taylor, Transcript of Record, supra note 28, at 380 21-29, 381 1-6.
123. Id.
[Vol. 117:3
2013] DOES LIVING BY THE SWORD MEAN DYING BY THE SWORD? 737
In the end, the Trial Chamber, having ordered that new private
counsel be assigned to Taylor, delayed the trial by almost five full
months to give the defense team adequate time to review the disclosure
and prepare their client's defense before the first prosecution witnesses
were called to the stand. 124 Ironically, had the same judges given the
defense counsel and the accused three additional months to prepare for
the opening of the prosecution's case, that major delay in the opening of
the trial could have been easily avoided.
Taken together, this sampling of four important cases from the ad
hoc tribunals demonstrates the various ways that international penal
courts have weighed the decision whether or not to assign counsel over
the defendant's wishes. Each court eventually made the decision to
impose some form of counsel based on the interests of justice. The
Milo§evi court at the ICTY initially fretted over preservation of the
defendant's rights but later became very concerned with the expediency
of the trial and the undue delay that allowing him to continue without
counsel would cause. In Barayagwiza, the ICTR was primarily
concerned with balancing the defendant's rights against ensuring the
trial's inherent fairness and continuity. In the Norman and Gbao cases at
the SCSL, the judges considered the expediency of the trial, its overall
fairness given his two co-defendants at trial, and various other factors.
Yet in Taylor, a different group of judges than in the Norman case
effectively assumed that the defendant was seeking to manipulate the
proceedings-as the prosecutors had claimed. The Taylor Trial Chamber
therefore qualified the defendant's right to represent himself without
much further deliberation or giving the defendant the opportunity to
clarify his actual position. For instance, the judges could have instead
invited Taylor to attend court and to show cause as to why counsel
should not be imposed on him. Such an invitation would have given him
an opportunity to be heard before this fundamental right was taken away.
At the same time, this qualification of the defendant's right might
have been the common sense solution because there had already been
enough delays in that trial. It is also true that, unlike the ICTY and
ICTR, the SCSL was under significant pressure to conduct its trials in a
shorter time frame. Thus, extraneous considerations might have been
influential to the final judicial decision. Whatever the case, there was
apparently little judicial appetite to cater to the demands of a defendant
that the prosecutors basically charged was simply being manipulative.
The chamber also saved scarce resources, in the notoriously cash trapped
donations based court, and moved the trial process forward when it
124. Id.
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
ordered appointment of competent counsel. This was what Taylor really
wanted. Indeed, the accused, for his part, never complained about the
forfeiture of his right of self-representation; as he seemed happy enough
to get the quality defense team that he had always wanted to be assigned
to represent him in the first place.
In the result, unlike the ICTY's stance in Miloevi6, the stance taken
by the SCSL and ICTR trial chambers in Norman, Gbao, Taylor, and
Barayagwiza were similar. Each chamber basically determined that the
defendants were either boycotting the proceedings, after choosing to
absent themselves from the trial, concluding that their decisions to
terminate counsel without informing the tribunals were attempts to
obstruct the proceedings. The difference between these decisions and the
rulings of national courts faced with similar situations seems, at least
partially, like a striking reflection of the larger goals of international
criminal justice and the influence of civil law thinking. Consider the
recent multi-accused case of Regina v. Iqbal before the English Court of
Appeal Criminal Division during which one defendant became
dissatisfied with his appointed counsel leading to an alleged breakdown
in their relationship. 125 He requested a change of counsel, but did not
provide the court with a substantial reason to justify his decision to
change his form of representation. The judge ended up requiring that
Iqbal, if he wanted to dispense with counsel, represent himself during the
trial. 126
This ruling stands in stark contrast to the SCSL decision in Norman.
The U.K. court was seemingly unconcerned with the unfairness that
might arise for Iqbal's five co-defendants. Rather, it cited the risks of
allowing intentional delays of trial by approving unjustified changes to
assigned counsel as the primary consideration. Additionally, the appeals
court actually considered the interests of the five represented co-
defendants as a reason to allow Iqbal to continue without counsel.
127
Because the other defendants would be represented, there was less
danger from Iqbal unduly slowing or disrupting the course of the trial. It
seems plausible that the Norman Trial Chamber could have reached a
similar conclusion, considering that it had also ordered Norman to be
assisted during courtroom proceedings by the court-appointed duty
counsel who was a lawyer from the Defense Office.
125. R. v. Iqbal, [2011] EWCA (Crim.) 1294 (Eng.), 2011 WL 1151103 (Mar. 23,
2011).
126. Id. 17, 19, 23.
127. Id. 30.
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The case of U.S. v. Vernier,128 recently heard before the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, presents a second good contrast with the
balancing process at the international level. In that case, the defendant
Vernier told a third party that he intended to disrupt his trial and make a
political statement. However, the court denied his request to proceed to
trial without representation. 129 This decision highlights the importance to
the ICTY of maintaining the appearance of a just trial in the Milogevi
case. Milogevid had also commented to the media about the legitimacy
of both the tribunal and his upcoming trial. Given his comments, his
health, and the considerably larger stage from which the trial would be
conducted, the threat of disruption from Milogevid was as great, if not
greater, than the threat of disruption posed by Vernier.
There are several possible explanations why the ICTY demonstrated
greater leniency towards Milogevi6 as compared to the Fifth Circuit's
treatment of Vernier. The goals of the court shift based upon what is at
stake for each respective defendant. The Milogevi Court was
considering charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, some of
the worst crimes of which a person can be accused. The Vernier Court
was dealing with a defendant accused of a car-jacking that resulted in a
person's death, which is serious, but relatively less so when compared to
the mass scale nature of international crimes in which thousands and
thousands typically die.13° As the scale of crime becomes less severe, the
court's concern with maintaining the continuity of the trial and refusing
to allow the defendant's tactics to delay justice becomes greater.
Additionally, compared to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and
those of other national jurisdictions, which have established legitimacy
due to a long legal tradition, international penal courts, which are a
newer phenomenon, are seemingly more concerned with maintaining the
appearance of legitimacy for their verdicts. Moreover, the Milogevi6
case was the first major case in which the issue of self-representation
confronted international criminal tribunal judges, and the hotbed of
issues facing international courts and their legitimacy makes respect for
the rights of the defendant even more critical.
At the same time, much like many national courts that do not tend
to countenance a recalcitrant defendant's attempt to manipulate the
justice system, the countervailing consideration is that international penal
tribunals should not allow the accused to manipulate the ground rules to
undermine victims' confidence in the process and ultimately to avoid
facing justice. That said, in addition to the previously cited factors, the
128. United States v. Vernier, 381 F. App'x 325 (5th Cir. 2010).
129. Id. at 327.
130. Although, Vernier was sentenced to life imprisonment.
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relative leniency may partly be a function of international criminal trials
being expected to operate at a higher level of respect for defendant rights
vis-A-vis domestic trials because international tribunals are often
intended to serve as models of fairness for national courts. Strict concern
to ensure compliance with the fair trial provisions mandated by
international human rights law, such as those found in ICCPR Article 14,
appears to influence judges to treat defendants with greater sensitivity.
The high visibility and media interest generated by high profile
international cases also creates some inevitable pressure for the system to
function above board. The careful balancing required of international
criminal tribunals, therefore, results in what appears to be greater leeway
than one would find granted within a domestic appellate or other court.
A final basis for comparison comes from the trial that arose from
the appeal in Clark v. Perez.1 31 In that case, the court allowed the
defendant Clark to represent herself during the trial. The trial judge
warned her, however, that if she was disruptive during the course of the
trial, she would be removed from the court and the trial would continue
in her absence. 132 On the first day of trial, Clark explained to the jury
that she did not believe the court or the trial was legitimate, and,
therefore, she would not participate. 133 After she departed the court, the
trial continued in its entirety with no one seated at the table for the
defense. 134  The judge did not appoint anyone to represent Clark's
interests, but did allow the defendant to follow the remainder of the trial
through a radio transmission to her holding cell.
135
Proceeding with the trial while no one represented the defendant is
an option the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL never even considered in
Miloevik, Barayagwiza, Norman, Gbao, and Taylor, and with good
reason. The goals of the international penal courts could not have been
fulfilled had those defendants been convicted without being either
present or represented by some counsel. Beyond the obvious detriment
to the overall fairness of the trial, there could be limited possibility to
help foster national healing or reconciliation if an international tribunal
simply rehashed the crimes of the accused and convicted him without
anyone at court trying to present his side of the story.
The rationale that a defendant must be afforded every possible
chance to give his side of the story is similar to that of civil law systems
that are willing to override the accused person's wishes through the
131. Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008).
132. Id. at 386.
133. Id. at 387.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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imposition of counsel whenever deemed necessary. In a way, this logic
may represent the meeting point between the civil and common law
systems given Chief Justice Burger's admonition in Faretta that criminal
justice systems should not permit themselves to be used by defendants,
who against all common sense forgo the assistance of counsel as a way
to achieve self-destruction, or, as Justice Blackmun put it in his dissent in
the same case, as a vehicle for "personal or political self-gratification."'
' 36
Sometimes, preserving fairness means restricting the autonomy of
the defendant as the court did in the ICTR and the SCSL. At other times,
as in the ICTY, especially in Milogevik, the international courts deferred
to the defendant's wishes to a far greater extent than one would expect to
see on the national level. The most distinct and noticeable difference in
the decisions reviewed above is the willingness of the national courts to
allow defendants to dig their own grave, so to speak. In Iqbal, for
example, the court responded to the defendant's frivolous complaints by
requiring him to go through trial alone. The Perez court similarly let the
trial proceed without any defense being presented at all, simply because
that was the way the defendant wanted it. These kinds of problematic
decisions may be justifiable at the municipal level, but not so at the
international level given that the defendants in the latter setting are often
charged with heinous international crimes such as genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.
One possible noteworthy exception to this observation can be found
in the Statute of the Lebanon Tribunal, which, going against the grain of
the ICTR's Barayagwiza ruling and international criminal tribunal
experience generally, allows for the possibility of trials in absentia.
137
136. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 849 (1975).
137. Article 22(1) of the Statute for the STL reads:
The Special Tribunal shall conduct trial proceedings in the absence of the
accused, if he or she:
(a) Has expressly and in writing waived his or her right to be present;
(b) Has not been handed over to the Tribunal by the State authorities
concerned;
(c) Has absconded or otherwise cannot be found and all reasonable steps
have been taken to secure his or her appearance before the Tribunal and to
inform him or her of the charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Judge.
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon art. 21(1), S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1 757, at 20 (May 30, 2007) [hereinafter STL Statute]. While the above
requirements of the statute appeared to be cumulative, Rule 106(A) of the STL Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, adopted by the judges on March 20, 2009, essentially
reproduced the content of Article 22. However, Rule 106(A) introduced two significant
amendments imposing "a reasonable time" requirement for the handing over of a suspect
and the phrase "or" was introduced obviously to permit the STL to proceed with in
absentia trials where only one of the three requirements enshrined in the statutory
provision is met. The question is whether the United Nations and Lebanon, the drafters
of the STL Statute, should have amended the statute in this way instead of judges
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This is an exception to the general rule, which in practice may prove to
be so challenging that the international community might choose to
abandon this strategy. The Statute, however, provides several checks to
ensure that a modicum of fairness is maintained. The accused must have
been given notice of the trial proceeding in his absence, and counsel
must have been appointed by either the defendant or the Court.138 As a
result, whether the accused is present or not, the STL Statute does not
allow for a Perez situation where the defense table in the courtroom
remains empty.
Additionally, the STL Rules of Procedure and Evidence guarantee
that, if an absent defendant appears before the conclusion of the trial, he
is automatically granted the right to have a retrial if certain preconditions
are fulfilled. 3 9 This said, this right is only guaranteed once.' 40  The
provision for trials in absentia reflects the civil law tradition more
strongly than any previous international court.' 4' Furthermore, the use of
trials when the defendant is absent was included as part of the Special
Tribunal because Lebanon's domestic legal system follows the civil law
tradition and the STL reflects those practices. 4' However, the prospect
of in absentia trials has already been the subject of significant criticism.
Indeed, based on rulings by the Human Rights Committee and the
European Court of Human Rights, strong grounds exist to argue that the
STL provision is a violation of international human rights norms-an
argument that the tribunal judges will likely resist. 143
There is also concern that the provisions for providing notice to the
accused and for granting a retrial are insufficient to protect the rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR.144 Consequently, there is further concern that
the legitimacy of the STL will subsequently erode abroad, and perhaps
stepping into the arena of legislators and doing so themselves. See id.; STL RPE, supra
note 20. For an application of these provisions in deciding to proceed with in absentia
trials against four suspects, see Prosecutor v. Jamil Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-O1/I/TC,
Decision to Hold Trial in Absentia (Feb. 1, 2012).
138. STL Statute, supra note 137, art. 22(2).
139. STLRPE, supra note 20, R. 108.
140. Id.
141. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
Establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 8, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (Nov. 15,
2006).
142. Id. 32.
143. See Chris Jenks, Notice Otherwise Given: Will in Absentia Trials at the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon Violate Human Rights?, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 57, 61-62 (2009).
144. It is worth noting that the STL is not purely an "international" court in the same
way as the ICTY or ICTR because it was created by an agreement with the country of
Lebanon. This distinction explains some of the divergence from the rules of the two
purely international tribunals. See Fausto Pocar, The Proliferation of International
Criminal Courts and Tribunals: A Necessity in the Current International Community, 2 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 304, 305 (2004).
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even within Lebanon, if the option of in absentia trials is given effect in
cases that are eventually tried. 45  Admittedly, such conclusions are
probably speculative at this point in the absence of actual trials in that
court. Nevertheless, even in the first cases in which this controversial in
absentia trial regime was approved recently, the appointment of
permanent counsel to represent the accused was deemed necessary. In
one such case, appointment of permanent counsel occurred the very next
day, although it is uncertain how the eight assigned lawyers in that case
will mount a defense for suspects with whom they cannot presumably
communicate. 1
46
Each of the above tribunal decisions demonstrates the importance
the international courts place on maintaining the perception of complete
fairness and a just trial. At the national level, however, courts are far
more likely to restrict the autonomy of the defendant to ensure the trial
progresses forward without disruption. Part of the reason for this
distinction, to reiterate the point, is that international trials have to
establish both the legality and legitimacy of their actions. International
courts are widely seen as backup systems that, in the language of the ICC
statute, that will only come to apply in situations of inactivity and when
the national jurisdictions are unwilling and/or unable to prosecute. 147
One aspect of the civil law system that the majority of international
tribunals seem to have adopted is the belief that it is not always up to the
defendant to protect his own rights at trial. Even though Barayagwiza,
Norman, Gbao, and Taylor all tried to take steps that would have
seriously harmed their chances of acquittal, the courts refused to allow
them to impair the appearance of total fairness. Instead, much like in the
civil law system, the court assumed a more proactive stance and required
the defendants to make use of legal counsel in order to facilitate a fair
and expeditious trial. This assumption perhaps represents an
international belief that both truth and justice are vital objectives to be
achieved. On the other side of the coin, decisions such as those in
Norman and Baravagwiza have become more common after the ICTY
received trenchant criticism for apparently bending over backwards to
accommodate Milogevid. There is ample literature confirming a general
145. Jenks, supra note 143, at 97.
146. See Prosecutor v. Jamil Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-Ol/I/PTJ, Assignment of
Counsel for Proceedings Held in Absentia Pursuant to Rule 106 of Rules (Feb. 2, 2012)
(assigning lawyers to represent the suspects in their absence based upon the request of the
pre-trial judge); see also Press Release, Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Assignment of
Permanent Counsel (Feb. 2, 2012), available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/en/media/press-
releases/02-02-2012-assignment-of-permanent-counsel.
147. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 17.
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feeling among scholars that Milogevid's dilatory tactics were seen as
having robbed his alleged victims of the chance to see justice done.
B. Should the Court Appoint Standby or Amicus Curiae Counsel?
The second question that courts at both the international and
national level often face is the choice between standby counsel and
amicus counsel. The most pertinent comparison within international
jurisprudence on this subject is between the aforementioned Miloevik
and Segelj cases. One important principle that both of the chambers
utilized and established as part of international criminal procedure is the
proportionality principle.
The ICTY Appeals Chamber first invoked this principle in
Miloevi6 in an attempt to temper the modalities order of the Trial
Chamber in their appointment of defense counsel.1 48 The appeals court
ruled that the appointment of counsel, while appropriate, had gone too
far in completely divesting control of the trial from Milosevic.149 The
proportionality principle dictated that the trial judges could only restrict
Milogevi6's right to conduct his own defense to the minimum extent
necessary to accomplish the objective of ensuring a fair and expedient
trial. 50 The Appeals Chamber, therefore, ruled that any time Milogevi6's
health allowed him to attend a court proceeding, the judges must allow
him to handle his own case. 15' The assigned counsel would only take
over when he was unable to attend. In a sense, the appeals judges placed
the appointed defense counsel into a super-standby counsel role. This
decision essentially indicated that the risk of disruption was only
sufficient to move from using amicus curiae to standby counsel, rather
than stripping Milogevi6 of the right to defend himself entirely.
The Trial Chamber in Segelj referred to the same proportionality
principle. 152 The court used the principle to consider the effect of his
numerous pre-trial disruptions. Before requesting to proceed without
counsel, Se~elj had made numerous public statements declaring his intent
to cause trouble and disrupt the proceedings. 153 Due to the threat of
disruption these statements provided, the ICTY Trial Chamber
determined that standby counsel was a more appropriate form of
148. See MilogeviM, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber's
Decision on the Assignment of Defense Counsel, supra note 25, 18.
149. See id. 16.
150. See id. 17.
151. Seeid. 19.
152. See Segelj, Decision on Assignment of Counsel, supra note 36, 46-51.
153. See id. 30.
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restriction on Segelj than simply appointing amicus curiae as the court
had done for the MilogeviW trial.'
54
The more interesting decision in the Segel" case came later when the
Appeals Chamber removed standby counsel based on a complaint raised
by the defendant. 55 After the trial began, the court had tried to assign
defense counsel to the accused and terminated his right to conduct his
own defense. When the appellate court reversed that position because it
required a warning to be issued first, the trial judges re-assigned standby
counsel.' 56  The Appeals Chamber controversially agreed with the
defendant, ruling that the lower court's action had undermined their
previous decision reinstating his right to conduct his own defense.'57 The
appeals judges determined that, despite his disruptions, their prior
decision had wiped the slate clean. Consequently, Segelj deserved to
continue to conduct his defense without restriction until his behavior
demonstrated that such a restriction was necessary. 
58
This decision, if followed, appears to be favorable to self-
representing defendants. However, it creates a troubling precedent for
future international penal tribunals. The trial court considered Segelj's
past actions in making their decision at the beginning of the trial to
appoint standby counsel. Then, halfway through the trial, the Appeals
Chamber ruled that his past actions up to that point were not grounds for
the imposition of standby counsel upon his rights. Perhaps the judges
were concerned with mitigating the hunger strike that the defendant had
engaged upon in protest. Be that as it may, while the appeals judgment
would usually carry significantly more weight, consideration of past
behavior and the threat of disruption have generally continued to guide
the appointment of standby counsel at the international level. At the
national level, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, given
Segelj's previous courtroom antics, counsel would have been imposed on
the defendant irrespective of what his wishes were.
These decisions reflect the need for the widely accepted "balancing
test" that courts apply in the United States to decide how much autonomy
to allow a defendant in running the defense. Courts will weigh the
prejudice to the defendant's legitimate interests against the potential
154. See Segelj, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav e~elj with His Defence, supra note 4, 30.
155. See Prosecutor v. egelj, Case No. 03-67-AR73.4, Decision on Appeal Against
Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 8, 2006) [hereinafter ,efelj, Decision on Appeal Against Trial
Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on Assignment of Counsel].
156. See id. 3.
157. See id. 26.
158. See id. 27.
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disruption to the trial proceedings. 159 As part of that assessment, courts
will consider "the defendant's reasons for the self-representation request,
the quality of counsel representing the party, and the party's prior
proclivity to substitute counsel."'
160
Standby counsel is the much more widespread solution to balancing
these interests in the United States when allowing a defendant to conduct
his own defense. The Supreme Court in Faretta specifically referenced
standby counsel as an allowable restriction even over the defendant's
objection. 161 Similarly, in McKaskle v. Wiggins, the highest court upheld
the lower court's appointment of standby counsel to help guide a
defendant through courtroom procedure, thus relieving the judge of that
responsibility. 62 It seems to have been accepted in U.S. courts that
standby counsel is preferable because they are both more able to
effectively assist a pro se defendant during the course of trial and can
also more easily step in to take over the defense should it become
necessary during trial.
Given the influence of the civil law tradition, however, the logic of
the U.S. experience is not entirely reproducible within an international
court. This is because, in the civil law, counsel's main goal is not
necessarily to defend and protect the defendant's interests but is aimed at
assisting or guiding the defendant in presenting his story to the court.
Lawyers in the civil law tradition are more restricted in acting without
specific instructions from a defendant. It is therefore problematic for
standby counsel to take over a case for a defendant at international law
without either a mandate or instructions from the defendant on how to
proceed with the defense. 163  Due to this problem, depending on the
unique facts of each case, amicus curiae may well be a relatively better
option at international law.
Amicus curiae could assist the court to avoid having the defense
depend entirely on the decisions of defendants more interested in making
political statements to domestic constituencies than actually refuting
prosecution allegations or making their own case. Moreover, given the
complexity and length of international criminal trials, having amicus
counsel assist the court with many different issues that arise is perhaps
159. See United States v. Pickett, 387 F. App'x 32, 34 (2d Cir. 2010).
160. Id.
161. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
162. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 196-97 (1984).
163. See Jarinde Temminck Tuinstra, Assisting an Accused to Represent Himself:
Appointment of Amici Curiae as the Most Appropriate Option, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 47,
52 (2006).
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more helpful and necessary to ensuring a fair trial than is the case in a
typical criminal trial in the United States. 164
In a messy and disrupted international trial, there may be significant
advantages to having an independent amicus voice helping to protect the
defendant's interests rather than standby counsel, who are necessarily
required to continue on behalf of the accused. In the former situation,
the defendants have limited control over counsel, whereas in the latter
scenario, they could choose to stop cooperating with standby counsel and
use that as a trump card to undermine the actual process and even
perhaps its legitimacy. Whatever decision an international court makes
must be proportional. This helps to ensure that any limitation or
infringement on the defendant's right will only be to the extent necessary
to preserve a fair and expeditious trial.
C. Options upon Removal of the Disruptive Defendants
The final question faced by international criminal tribunals is what
action should be taken when a defendant, either with or without
representation, is so disruptive that he has to be removed, or is absent
from the proceedings. The question of what to do when a defendant has
representation but is not present on a particular occasion is fairly well
settled. In both national and international law, with a few minor
exceptions, courts usually are able to proceed with the trial as long as the
defendant's counsel is able to represent him. While there is a principled
guarantee in the ICCPR that the defendant will be present at trial, courts
have restricted this right as long as a warning is given to the defendant
that the trial will proceed in his absence. 165
To bypass the right to be present, courts typically consider
defendants to have waived the right. 166 The ICTR amended its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence in May 2003 to include Rule 82bis to explicitly
recognize this possibility. 167 The ICTY and SCSL also explicitly allow
164. See id. at 62-63.
165. See ,efelj, Decision on Prosecution's Motion for Order Appointing Counsel to
Assist Vojislav egelj with His Defence, supra note 4, 30.
166. Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgement, 95-100 (Nov. 28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T-
194, Ruling on the Issue of the Refusal of the Third Accused, Augustine Gbao to Attend
Hearing of the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 7 July 2004 and Succeeding Days, 3
(July 12, 2004); Taylor, Transcript of Record, supra note 28, at 258.
167. If an accused refuses to appear before the Trial Chamber for trial, the Chamber
may order that the trial proceed in the absence of the accused for so long as his refusal
persists, provided that the Trial Chamber is satisfied that: (i) the accused has made his
initial appearance under Rule 62; (ii) the Registrar has duly notified the accused that he is
required to be present for trial; and (iii) the interests of the accused are represented by
counsel. ICTRRPE, supra note 21, R. 82bis.
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the court to remove defendants from the courtroom and continue in their
absence so long as a warning has been given.168 The notion of waiver, of
course, permits a non-disruptive defendant to take a sick day or to be
absent from court for good reasons such as ill health while giving his
principled indication that the trial may proceed.
Similarly, as discussed previously, Article 63(2) of the Rome
Statute of the ICC also permits the trial chamber to order the removal of
a disruptive defendant from the court as a last resort. However, in such
cases, Article 63(2) mandates alternative ways for him to observe the
trial and to instruct counsel from outside the courtroom. American courts
have frequently employed telecommunications technology to allow
defendants who have been removed to view or listen to court
proceedings, even when they are not physically present. 69  This
approach has also been similarly utilized in the tribunals. Video
recordings and transcripts of proceedings are typically made available so
that defendants may view them at their leisure. 7°
The more problematic situation arises when the defendant does not
have defense counsel available or when defense counsel is removed from
court for disruption or when the defendant refuses to come to court.
Perhaps the best ICTY example of a pro se defendant simply not
showing up for trial is the Karadi5 case. 1 7 1 The defendant in that case
believed that he should be given significantly more time to prepare his
defense than the court had allowed and refused to attend court
proceedings until he felt prepared. The Trial Chamber ruled that the
interests of justice required the court delay the beginning of trial to give
appointed defense counsel time to adequately prepare. As it turned out,
by the time appointed counsel was ready to continue, so was Karadii6,
and the court allowed him to continue handling his own defense while
maintaining the previously appointed lawyers as standby counsel. 1
72
Again, a comparison with national decisions demonstrates the
concern at the international level with preserving the perception of
fairness in trials of those accused of heinous international crimes. The
168. See ICTY RPE,supra note 21, R. 80; see also SCSLRPE, supra note 21, R. 80.
169. See Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing a trial judge's
decision to allow defendants to listen to proceeding from a holding cell); see also Torres
v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing defendant's choice to
listen to proceeding from a holding cell).
170. The requirement of a video link for defendants removed from Court is actually
codified in the SCSL Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See SCSL RPE, supra note 21,
R. 80.
171. Karad.iW, Decision on Appointment of Counsel and Order on Further Trial
Proceedings, supra note 26, 1.
172. See Prosecutor v. Karad~id, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Decision on Designation of
Standby Counsel, 8-10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 15, 2010).
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defendant in Karadi6 essentially handcuffed the court into delaying the
trial unless they chose to proceed with no one representing the defendant.
The chamber either had to succumb to the defendant's demands and
delay trial so that he could prepare, or they had to delay trial to give
appointed counsel time to prepare.
Defendants seemingly gain more time to prepare by refusing to
come to court than when they do in fact attend. This maybe a function of
ad hoc tribunal judges being under some pressure to keep the trials on
some sort of schedule, especially given the usual length of international
cases, meaning that deviations from the forecasted timelines meet with a
healthy dose of skepticism. Ad hoc tribunals thus hesitate to grant delays
favoring defendants that could lead to both internal and external
criticism, especially in the face of their respective completion strategies.
When it is possible to blame the delay on the defendant, after a defendant
has boycotted the proceedings, then they seem willing to make the
decision to restore the defendant's participation. The irony is that, in at
least two instances, such as the opening and closing of the Taylor case at
the SCSL, giving the defense more time to prepare would have obviated
the later need for defendants to threaten to boycott the proceedings.
A question thus arises whether the tribunal judges are acting fairly
in dealing with such defense requests or whether they are tainted with the
typical prosecution argument that the defendants are being nothing more
than dilatory rather than asserting a legitimate request. The same may
have been true in the Karad~i5 case at the ICTY. It remains to be seen
whether future trials, especially at the ICC, which in a few years will
likely be the last court standing, will be more sympathetic to defendant
requests for more time to review the often-large disclosure dumped on
them by tribunal prosecutors thereby eliminating the need for accused
persons' refusal to attend court in at least some of the cases.
In contrast, U.S. courts are not nearly as willing to be challenged by
a defendant into allowing delays in trial proceedings. A good example is
Davis v. Grant, argued before the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in 2008.173 After several warnings and numerous outbursts
before the jury at his trial for assault, grand larceny, and reckless
endangerment-including profanities directed at the judge-the court
removed the defendant and continued the trial. 17 4 On appeal, the court
173. See Davis v. Grant, 532 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (ruling that defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was not violated when he was removed from trial for
disruptive conduct in absence of appointed standby counsel).
174. Id. at 136-37.
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upheld the decision to continue with the trial despite the fact that the
defendant was not present at trial and had no counsel to represent him. 175
Although the appellate judges affirmed the conviction, they took
care to underscore that their decision turned on the specifics of that case,
thereby undermining arguments that it could serve as future precedent. 176
In a somewhat unconventional move, perhaps reflecting the court's
discomfort with its decision, the Second Circuit explicitly requested in its
opinion that the U.S. Supreme Court should clarify the extent to which
disruptive behavior constituted a waiver of the right to appearpro se and
whether it was mandatory upon a lower court to appoint standby counsel
for the duration of the trial. 177 Perhaps the state of the law on these
issues is somewhat unsettled, even if the idea is obvious that a self-
representing defendant acting in bad faith should not be rewarded with
more grants of even greater liberties.
A stronger precedent exists within the U.S. for defendants choosing
to represent themselves and then voluntarily remaining absent for the
duration of trial. This scenario happened twice in the Second Circuit in
the cases of Clark v. Perez,178 as well as famously in U.S. v. Torres.179 In
both cases, the defendants chose to leave the court in order to further
political ideologies, when they tried to deny the legitimacy of the court's
authority to conduct the trial. In both cases, the court proceeded without
appointing amicus curiae or standby counsel to protect the defendants'
interests, and the jury found both defendants guilty of all charges.
In civil law and common law systems, there are typically
requirements that defendants are present at trial, even though the former
system is more flexible in that regard. At the regional level, the
European Court of Human Rights has affirmed the rights of defendants
to be present at appellate proceedings in addition to the criminal trial.' 80
It is a difficult problem when the defendant, as well as when all legal
counsel, is either absent or removed from the court given how essential
representation is to the concept of a fair trial. As international criminal
procedures mature, there will likely be a swing towards the civil law.
That trend is already discernible. Two different sides opposing one
another are presumably necessary for the largely adversarial process
presently existing to work. The international criminal justice system has
not yet been willing to proceed with a trial where there was no one
175. Id. at 138-39.
176. Id. at 149.
177. Davis, 532 F.3d at 150.
178. Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382, 387 (2d Cir. 2008).
179. Torres v. United States, 140 F.3d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1998).
180. Helmers v. Sweden, 212 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 33 (1991), available at
http:/ihudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57701.
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present to represent the interests of the accused. However, courts in the
United States, Canada, 181 Britain, and other common law jurisdictions
have taken this step on occasion. But, unlike those courts, the
international tribunals should be careful in that domain and try to remain
true to the "interests of justice" standard. They must hold strictly to the
idea that the fairness of the trial comes before all else, despite the
increasing pressures to swiftly complete cases and or to close down.
V. CONCLUSION
The international criminal law has come a long way in the last few
decades. In a recent open session at the ICTY on July 4, 2011, the Trial
Chamber in the Mladi case, within just an hour in court, denied a
request to give the defendant more time to review the indictment and
supporting evidence before entering a plea, denied a request by counsel
to withdraw due to a lack of communication with the accused, denied a
request by the defendant to delay the trial until his counsel of choice
could be assigned, removed the defendant from court for disruptive
behavior, and continued entering pleas for the defendant after he was
removed. 182 All of these decisions occurred without the court-appointed
duty counsel raising a single protest or caution regarding the court's
actions.'83
This is a remarkable transformation from the early case law
discussed in this article granting extensive delays to ensure that all of the
defendant's rights were respected. The See1j court, for example,
allowed the defendant to direct its rulings regarding the assignment of
counsel rather than attempting to continue the trial without him being
present. 184 The approach in that case is reflective of a recent trend in
decisions issued at international tribunals. Since the heavily criticized
handling of the Miloevi6 trial, international courts have steadily become
stricter in dealing with attempts by defendants to upset the continuity of
trial. Earlier in the days of the international tribunals, interest in the
appearance of fairness trumped expediency in nearly every decision the
court issued. With trials at the ICTY and ICTR wrapping up, however,
courts have learned how to deal with frivolous attempts by the accused to
cause delays while at the same time acknowledging and permitting
legitimate exercise of their statutory rights.1 85 A much higher importance
181. R. v. Bittemose, [2009] SKCA 54 97, 331 Sask. R. 19 (Can.).
182. See Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladi6, Case No. IT-09-92-I, Transcript of Record (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 4, 2011).
183. See id.
184. See Segelj, Decision on Appeal against Trial Chamber's Decision (No. 2) on
Assignment of Counsel, supra note 155, 20-29.
185. See POCAR, supra note 37, at 8.
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is now being placed on finishing the mission of the tribunals and
completing the administration ofjustice for the crimes committed.
There is more to the paradigm shift than simply wanting to
complete the proceedings. After Milogevi6 embarrassed the tribunal with
his antics-and after his death, which meant that no formal judgment
could be pronounced on his guilt or innocence-there was a definite
public backlash against the freedom he was granted by the ICTY. The
results of this backlash may well be reflected in the STL Statute, which
allows for the trial of accused in absentia. These types of changes
perhaps reflect lessons learned and the belief that firmer positions may
be necessary during court proceedings as more and more international
criminal trials are held. This paradigm shift, which speaks to both the
need to improve the efficiency of trial procedures and the refusal to bow
to the whims and caprices of manipulative and clever accused persons,
has already been seen for decades in national criminal law. It is a well-
trodden path. At the same time, in the international courts, these changes
will raise new concerns about the need to balance the competing interests
at stake and to maintain the integrity and fairness of trials for those
accused of serious international offenses.
186
The more stringent controls, and especially the in absentia
provisions of the STL Statute, are perhaps indicative of a steady rise of
civil law principles within international law. This gravitational pull is
perhaps also reflective of global changes in common and civil law
systems. There has been scholarly documentation of the steady
convergence of the two types of systems recently. 187 Many of the
distinguishing features of each system have been slowly adopted by
countries of the opposing system, with a set of best practices emerging in
those jurisdictions. 88 These developments may lead one to believe that
systems of criminal justice at both the national and international level are
finally "getting it right," but there is still much to learn, and future
international tribunals would do well not to forget about upholding the
interests of justice in each decision.
One important element that has yet to be incorporated into
international justice is the principles from alternative legal systems.
Both the civil and common law traditions have a largely "Western"
background that excludes traditional African, Chinese, Indian, Islamic,
and many other legal traditions and beliefs. 189 How the major criminal
186. See Jenks, supra note 143, at 57; Williams, supra note 3, at 553.
187. See, e.g., Salvatore Mancuso, The New African Law: Beyond the Differences
Between Common Law and Civil Law, 14 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 39, 42-43
(2008); POCAR, supra note 37, at 1.
188. See Mancuso, supra note 187, at 42; POCAR, supra note 37, at 1.
189. Mancuso, supra note 187, at 43.
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justice belief systems can better adapt to situations where non-western
notions of justice predominate is an unsettled question. This question,
like all those facing ad hoc criminal tribunals now and others yet to exist,
requires a careful weighing of rights and interests. Some of those
systems emphasize more conciliatory and rehabilitative approaches, and
the jury is still out on whether those approaches are appropriate for
application in international criminal trial contexts.
If nothing else, this article's comparative law discussion of how
courts handle the role of counsel should have illuminated the many
different perspectives through which each decision at the international
court can be seen. Courts have to consider the fundamental rights of the
defendant guaranteed by the rules of the court, the interests of the victims
looking for justice, the finding of truth, fair and expeditious justice, the
importance of an evidence-based trial, and the possible contributions to
national healing.
When considering what lessons the international courts should draw
from common law systems, civil law systems, and their own unique
experiences, the aim to balance rights may well be the key, depending on
the factual scenario in each case. As the international criminal law
continues its lofty pursuit to "end impunity," it is unlikely that any single
panacea, such as allowing trials in absentia, will determine the success or
failure of the provision of international justice. There is no one size fits
all solution. If international tribunals apply such provisions, keeping in
mind the interests of justice, the accused as well as the victims,
international justice will likely come out farther ahead.
As evidence of this truth, consider the cases discussed in this article.
Despite alleged gaffes in judgment at the Milogevi6, Segelj, and
Barayagwiza trials, the ICTY and ICTR have been largely successful in
fairly prosecuting those responsible for some of the most gruesome
crimes, and no one has substantially contested the legitimacy of those
convictions. It is perhaps too soon to judge how history will ultimately
measure the success of the ICTR, ICTY, SCSL, and the STL. What is
clear is that the international community has saddled these tribunals with
an exceedingly difficult task, one that requires a careful balancing of
rights that no amount of rulemaking or statutory provisions will easily
solve.

